The general current of decision Mohri bibi v dharmodas ghose India certainly is that ever since the passing of the Indian Contract Act IX, of the contracts of infants are voidable only. The party rescinding a voidable contract shall, if he have received any benefit thereunder from another party to such contract, restore such benefit, so far as may be, to the person from whom it was received.
There can be no estoppel where the truth of the matter is known to both parties, and their Lordships hold, in accordance with English authorities, that a false representation, made to a person who knows it to be false, is not such a fraud as to take away the privilege of infancy: And the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal from him.
The present case, therefore, falls within the provisions of the latter Act. They do not consider it necessary to examine in detail the numerous decisions above referred to, as in their opinion the whole question turns upon what is the true construction of the Contract Act itself.
But this is the last point over again, and does not require further notice except by referring to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Thurstan v.
When a person at whose option a contract is voidable rescinds it, the other party thereto need not perform any promise therein contained of which he is promisor. And in support of this contention s. The section is as follows: This is clearly borne out by later sections in the Act.
They made the advances, and took from her a mortgage for the amount. The Court held that, as regards the purchase-money paid to the vendor, the society was entitled to stand in his place and had a lien upon the property, but that the mortgage must be declared void, and that the society was not entitled to any repayment of the advances.
Dealing with this part of their claim Romer L. Jogendranundinee Dasi, the mother and guardian appointed by the High Court under its letters patent Mohri bibi v dharmodas ghose the person and property of Babu Dhurmodas Ghose, that a Mohri bibi v dharmodas ghose of the properties of the said Babu Dhurmodas Ghose is being prepared from your office.
It was further argued that the preamble of the Act shewed that the Act was only intended to define and amend certain parts of the law relating to contracts, and that contracts by infants were left outside the Act.
Another enactment relied upon as a reason why the mortgage money should be returned is s. On adjudging the cancellation of an instrument the Court may require the party to whom such relief is granted to make any compensation to the other which justice may require.
They consider it clear that the section does not apply to a case like the present, where the statement relied upon is made to a person who knows the real facts and is not misled by the untrue statement.
The defendant, Brahmo Dutt, put in a defence that the plaintiff was of full age when he executed the mortgage; that neither he nor Kedar Nath had any notice that the plaintiff was then an infant; that, even if he was a minor, the declaration as to his age was fraudulently made to deceive the defendant, and disentitled the Mohri bibi v dharmodas ghose to any relief; and that in any case the Court should not grant the plaintiff any relief without making him repay the moneys advanced.
These sections, no doubt, do give a discretion to the Court; but the Court of first instance, and subsequently the Appellate Court, in the exercise of such discretion, came to the conclusion that under the circumstances of this case justice did not require them to order the return by the respondent of money advanced to him with full knowledge of his infancy, and their Lordships see no reason for interfering with the discretion so exercised.
Then, to turn to the Contract Act, s. On attaining twenty-one she brought the action to have the mortgage declared void under the Infants Relief Act. There is conflicting evidence as to the time when and circumstances under which that declaration was obtained; but it is unnecessary to go into this, as both Courts below have held that Kedar Nath did not act upon, and was not misled by, that statement, and was fully aware at the time the mortgage was executed of the minority of the respondent.
I am instructed to give you notice, which I hereby do, that the said Babu Dhurmodas Ghose is still an infant under the age of twenty-one, and any one lending money to him will do so at his own risk and peril.
The defendant was absent from Calcutta, and personally did not take any part in the transaction. If this were so, it does not appear how it would help the appellants.
It was entirely in charge of Kedar Nath, whose full authority to act as he did is not disputed. By a further statement the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had subsequently ratified the mortgage; but this case wholly failed, and is not the subject of appeal.
Their Lordships observe that the construction which they have put upon the Contract Act seems to be in accordance with the old Hindu Law as declared in the laws of Menu, ch.
The appellants must pay the costs of the appeal. On September 10,the infant, by his mother and guardian as next friend, commenced this action against Brahmo Dutt, stating that he was under age when he executed the mortgage, and praying for a declaration that it was void and inoperative, and should be delivered up to be cancelled.
But there is nothing in this. At that time the respondent was an infant; and he did not attain twenty-one until the month of September following.
On the day on which the mortgage was executed, Kedar Nath got the infant to sign a long declaration, which, he had prepared for him, containing a statement that he came of age on June 17; and that Babu Dedraj and Brahmo Dutt, relying on his assurance that he had attained his majority, had agreed to advance to him Rs.
It is sufficient to say that this section, like s. The question whether a contract is void or voidable presupposes the existence of a contract within the meaning of the Act, and cannot arise in the case of an infant.
Subsequently to the institution of the present appeal Brahmo Dutt died, and this appeal has been prosecuted by his executors.
Throughout the transaction Brahmo Dutt was absent from Calcutta, and the whole business was carried through for him by his attorney, Kedar Nath Mitter, the money being found by Dedraj, the local manager of Brahmo Dutt. It is necessary, therefore, to consider carefully the terms of that Act; but before doing so it may be convenient to refer to the Transfer of Property Act IV ofs.
It was also contended that one who seeks equity must do equity.Essays - largest database of quality sample essays and research papers on Mohri Bibi V Dharmodas Ghose.
MOHIRI BIVEE VS DHARMODAS GHOSH - Indian Kanoon Minors are not eligible to enter into contract u/s 11 of the contract act. Hence any contract with a minor. mohiri bibee vs dharmodas ghose Brahmo Dutt was a money-lender and carrying his business in Calcutta and elsewhere.
Dharmo Dass, a. Mar 04, · Judgment: SIR FORD NORTH, J. On July 20,the respondent, Dhurmodas Ghose, executed a mortgage in favour of Brahmo Dutt, a money-lender carrying on business at Calcutta and elsewhere, to secure the repayment of Rs.
20, at 12 per cent. interest on some houses belonging to the respondent. Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose. Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose. On October 22, November 13, Contract Law minor's contract Mohori Bibi Post navigation. PREVIOUS POST Previous post: Right to clean water.
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